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Abstract—Digital contents are typically sold online through
centralized and custodian marketplaces, which requires the
trading partners to trust a central entity. We present FileBounty,
a fair protocol which, assuming the cryptographic hash of
the file of interest is known to the buyer, is trust-free and
lets a buyer purchase data for a previously agreed monetary
amount, while guaranteeing the integrity of the contents. To
prevent misbehavior, FileBounty guarantees that any deviation
from the expected participants’ behavior results in a negative
financial payoff; i.e. we show that honest behavior corresponds
to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Our novel deposit
refunding scheme is resistant to extortion attacks under rational
adversaries. If buyer and seller behave honestly, FileBounty’s
execution requires only three on-chain transactions, while the
actual data is exchanged off-chain in an efficient and privacy-
preserving manner. We moreover show how FileBounty enables
a flexible peer-to-peer setting where multiple parties fairly sell a
file to a buyer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fair multi-party exchange protocols have been extensively
studied [1]–[9]. In light of the emergence of permissionless
blockchains (e.g. Bitcoin), however, the design of fair ex-
change protocols has experienced a renaissance [10]–[14].
The blockchain’s properties allow to construct marketplaces
without reliance on a centralized trusted third party (TTP), and
instead enable the automated dispute mediation and integrated
monetary transfers among buyers and sellers.
In this work, we first consider the following problem: we are
given two participants, a seller and a buyer that are willing to
exchange a digital file for a monetary amount. We assume that
both parties mutually do not trust each other, and we therefore
require a fair data exchange protocol. Our definition of fairness
implies that a dishonest participant always suffers negative
payoffs. In a second step, we consider the problem of a peer-
to-peer (P2P) file exchange protocol similar to Bittorrent [15],
whereby a buyer intents to purchase a file from multiple
sellers which are expect to be rewarded proportionally to their
provided contents.
We propose FileBounty, a fair protocol that allows a buyer
to purchase a digital file from a seller for a monetary amount.
FileBounty relies on the assumption that the buyer knows
the cryptographic hash1 of the file of interest (for example
acquired through a semi-trusted third party, such as VirusTotal
∗
These authors contributed equally to this work.
1Note in the extended P2P exchange protocol, we term the identity of a
file fingerprint.
or a Torrent website2). Given the file hash, a buyer e.g.
publishes on a blockchain an openly available bounty to
purchase the file of interest from a willing seller. Alternatively,
a seller can advertise its willingness to sell a file, similar to
Bittorrent magnet links, connect with a buyer and complete
the file and value transfer successfully. The file transfer is
executed off-chain, i.e. the actual file content is not written
on the bockchain; thus both protecting the privacy of the file
and remaining scalable to any filesize. Even in the case of
disputes, no file content needs to be disclosed as our on-chain
dispute process mediates via zkSNARKs. The file is moreover
exchanged gradually and integrity protected, i.e. for each file
chunk, which consists of multiple file blocks, transferred, the
buyer can efficiently verify that a chunk is a valid chunk
of the file of interest. We further extend FileBounty to a
distributed P2P setting, whereby a buyer can purchase the file
of interest from multiple sellers simultaneously, allowing the
transfer speed to scale proportionally to the number of sellers
and their network connectivity.
We adopt a rational adversarial model, under which, for
each transferred chunk, the seller is guaranteed to receive a
proportional payoff, as long as he doesn’t become unrespon-
sive (e.g. times-out). The smart contract verifies the proper ex-
ecution of the protocol to assure the correct participant payoffs
and automatically handles dispute mediation. We introduce a
deposit refunding scheme that guarantees that FileBounty is
secure against a rational adversary, i.e. the adversary will only
follow the honest protocol which corresponds to the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium. In other words, any deviation for any
player (buyer, seller) from the honest protocol behavior will
result in a financial loss to this player. For our design, we
make use of the chaining property of Merkle-Damgård-based
hash functions (cf. MD5 [16], SHA1 [17], SHA2 [18], etc.)
Potential application opportunities of FileBounty are exten-
sive: (i) decentralized digital marketplaces, (ii) purchase of
sparsely seeded torrent files, (iii) decentralized file backups,
(iv) brute-forcing of password hashes given their respective
salts and (v) exchange of malware samples3.
As a summary our contributions are as follows:
Fair one-to-one Exchange We propose FileBounty, a fair
data exchange protocol which allows a buyer (who knows
2Note that we consider the semi-trusted third party offline, because it is not
required to interact during or after the file exchange.
3i.e. http://www.virustotal.com
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the cryptographic hash of the file of interest), to make a
publicly available bounty call for a digital file.
Fair Multi-Party Exchange We present a novel multi-party
exchange protocol based on BLS signatures, whereby a
buyer can fairly purchase a file from multiple sellers.
Efficient Integrity Verification By taking advantage of the
Merkle-Damgård construction (e.g., in SHA256), our
design allows the buyer (who only knows the file hash)
to verify for each received file chunk, that the file chunk
belongs to the file of interest.
Privacy-Preserving We conduct the on-chain dispute media-
tion in a privacy-preserving manner through zkSNARKs.
Nash Equilibrium We show that FileBounty is secure under
a rational adversary, i.e. we show that honest behavior
is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Misbehavior
of any of the involved parties is detected while the data
is gradually exchanged. Contrary to previous schemes,
ours is resistant to extortion attacks under the rational
adversary.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II covers the background, Section III presents the system
and adversarial model and Section IV details FileBounty’s
design. Section V focuses on the security analysis while we
present our evaluation in Section VI. We overview related
work in Section VII and conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss the required background.
Blockchain In permissionless blockchains, any peer is free
to join or leave the network at any moment. Proof-of-
Work (PoW), introduced by [19], is a computationally
expensive puzzle that is the currently widest deployed
mechanism to operate permissionless blockchains (e.g.
Bitcoin). Besides the simple transfer of monetary value,
transactions can execute user-defined programs, com-
monly referred to as smart contracts, which alter the state
of the blockchain. For an in-depth background, we refer
the reader to [20].
Game Theory and Cryptoeconomics Fair multi-party pro-
tocols can be modeled as non-cooperative games, where
each party acts rationally in its own best interest. The
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium [21] is a game the-
oretic solution concept of the extensive form game that
we use in this paper to model the sequential interaction
between the seller and the buyer. In this solution, each
player plays the optimal strategy at each possible state.
If any player would change its strategy in this solution,
the expected financial gain is a non-positive number, as
such, no player has an incentive to change its strategy in
any state.
Merkle-Damgård and Sponge Construction The Merkle-
Damgård construction [22] allows to build a collision-
resistant cryptographic hash function with an arbitrary
size input from a collision-resistance one-way compres-
sion function. The arbitrary-length input data is divided
into fixed-length data chunks and use an underlying
cryptographic hash function in order to produce a final
hash (cf. Figure 1). For security purposes, the length of
the actual input data needs to be appended at the end of
the data. There are alternatives to the Merkle-Damgård
construction, like for example the Sponge construction
which is the basis for the SHA-3 hash function [23].
Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signature scheme The Boneh-Lynn-
Shacham (BLS) signature scheme [24] is a short digital
signature technique using a bilinear pairing on a curve
which supports signature aggregation [25] (e.g. compress-
ing multiple signatures signed by different private keys
on different messages in a single signature).
Zero Knowledge Proofs Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) [26]
allow a prover to prove to another verifier that a state-
ment is true but without revealing any information of it.
zkSNARKs [27] are succinct ZKP methods in which the
size of the proof is small enough to be verified efficiently
(e.g. by a smart contract). zkSNARKs are moreover non-
interactive i.e. no interaction is required between the
prover and the verifier.
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Figure 1. Merkle-Damgård construction. The input file is divided into m
blocks, and the construction is initialized with a fixed initialization vector
(IV). Intermediate states (Hi) represent temporary hashes, while the final file
hash is output at the top. Note that the length of the file (len) is attached to
the end of the file. Note that H(F ) corresponds to Hm.
III. FILEBOUNTY: OVERVIEW
In this Section, we first outline the system and adversarial
model followed by the detailed protocol specification.
A. System Model
Four parties are involved in our system: (i) a seller, (ii) buyer
(iii) semi-trusted third party which provides the cryptographic
hash of the file of interest and (iv) a smart contract.
Permissionless Blockchain We assume the existence of a
permissionless (e.g. Proof-of-Work) blockchain that sup-
ports the convenient deployment of smart contracts. Par-
ticipants have identities in the form of public keys that
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are tied to their respective private keys (Pubx/Privx) to
perform e.g. digital signatures.
Buyer The buyer B is the entity which is willing to purchase
the file F with cryptographic hash H(F ) from a seller
for a given price Fp.
Seller The seller S is the entity which claims to own and is
willing to transfer the digital file F , corresponding to the
cryptographic hash H(F ), to a buyer.
Semi-trusted third party The semi-trusted third party
(STTP) is a neutral party that has no incentive to report
incorrect hashes. The STTP plays the role of indirect
coordinator, providing the cryptographic hashes of files
to buyers.
To exchange the file F , we assume a communication
protocol external to the blockchain, which requires the buyer
or the seller to directly connect (e.g. over WebRTC).
Iterated Hash Functions Our protocol relies on iterated hash
functions [28] (such as SHA256). An iterated hash func-
tion takes a message M ∈ {0, 1}∗ of any length to
compute an s-bit output H(M). For an iterated hash,
we split the padded message into m fixed-sized parts
M1,M2, ...,Mm ∈ {0, 1}l. An iterated hash H iterates
an underlying compression function f , and the final hash
is given by f(f(...f(f(H0,M1),M2)...),Mm), where
H0 is some constant initial value usually denoted as
Initialization Vector (IV ).
We term the fixed-sized parts of a file fed into the integrated
hash functions blocks. Adjacent file blocks are bundled to
chunks as the transmission unit. In the P2P scheme, files are
split into segments which are exchanged separately. Segments
are exclusive parts of a file containing several file chunks.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the three terms.
B. High-Level Operation
We outline the high-level operations of FileBounty in Fig-
ure 2, which is divided into four phases.
Setup Phase (a) The sellers start to serve a file F by submit-
ting a set of requisite parameters and the deposit DS to
the smart contract. The buyer who is interested in F can
pay the file price FP with the deposit DB and initiate
off-chain communication channels to the alive sellers.
File Transfer Phase (b) Once the on-chain transactions con-
firmed in the setup phase and the off-chain channels are
established, the protocol enters into the file exchange
phase. The buyer receives F in chunks from one or
multiple sellers. For each transferred chunk, the client
verifies the chunk’s integrity given the file hash H(F )
and the seller receives a signed acknowledgment from
the buyer.
Dispute Phase (c) If one participant misbehaves, the ag-
grieved side is able to claim restitution via the smart
contract. If both sides behave honestly until the end
of transmission, the protocol will distribute payoff as
expected.
Payoff Phase (d) In the payoff phase, the smart contract
allocates the file price and the deposits to the buyer and
the seller according to the execution of the protocol.
File chunk  , Intermediate hash ck H ck−1
Smart Contract (a)
(a)
(b)
(d)
(c)
(c)
Buyer Sellers
Signed acknowledgement   Ak
Figure 2. Four phases of FileBounty — (a) setup phase; (b) file exchange
phase; (c) dispute phase; (d) payoff phase.
C. Main Properties
Permissionless Blockchain Blockchain transactions enable a
certain transaction throughput and bear a cost borne by
the buyer and seller.
Buyer The buyer is able to establish a secure communication
channel to the seller and interacts with a blockchain-based
smart contract. Prior to the exchange, the buyer provides
a monetary deposit of value DB . The file of interest is
worth Fv to the buyer.
Seller The seller is able to establish a secure communication
channel to the buyer and interacts with the blockchain-
based smart contract. Prior to the file exchange, the seller
provides a monetary deposit of value DS . The seller’s
costs for selling the file amounts to Fc.
Semi-trusted third party The STTP only assists in the trade
and is not involved in the exchange of any monetary nor
data transfer between the buyer and the seller.
D. Attacker Models
We assume that the underlying blockchain is reasonably
resistant against 51% and double-spending attacks. We assume
that the consensus mechanism of the blockchain achieves even-
tual consistency and that the transactions are non-repudiable
and non-malleable. We also assume, that FileBounty’s smart
contract implementation is secure [29]. Additionally, we rely
on the correct design and implementation of the cryptographic
primitives of the blockchain. We consider the off-chain con-
nection between the seller and buyer to be secure and stable
and not controllable by the adversary. All protocol participants
are assumed to be able to monitor the state changes of the
smart contract and respond timely. We assume the STTP is not
colluding with the seller. We also assume a rational adversary,
i.e. an adversary that is motivated by financial gain. As such,
our adversary is not interested in provoking the opponent to
lose a monetary amount during the protocol execution as it
would entail a loss for the adversary as well.
Malicious Seller A malicious seller might stop the transmis-
sion halfway causing the buyer to receive an incomplete
file which is worthless (e.g. compressed file). A malicious
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seller may also dishonestly report the buyer (e.g. pretend-
ing not to receive the acknowledgement from the buyer)
resulting in the possibility that the smart contract affirms
misbehaviour of the buyer. Besides, a malicious seller
can try to blackmail the buyer during the execution of
the protocol for additional financial reward. We analyze
the irrationality of extortion attacks in Section V-A. In
the P2P exchange, different sellers can collude with each
other (e.g. interrupting one exchange thread, the buyer
then can’t receive the complete file).
Malicious Buyer As the transfer process of FileBounty is
sequential, a malicious buyer may operate similar attacks
(i.e. refusing to acknowledge a file chunk so that the seller
can’t prove the delivery of a chunk, reporting dishonestly
and extortion attacks).
IV. FILEBOUNTY DETAILS
In the following we outline FileBounty’s details.
A. Formal Overview
We first depict FileBounty in detail for the single seller case.
We consider the buyer B is willing to purchase the file F with
the hash H(F ) from the seller S who claims to possess it.
We present in Algorithm 1 the pseudocode of the FileBounty
protocol which the seller and the buyer iteratively execute for
each chunk. FileBounty supports the following events:
• Tk corresponds to S transmitting the file chunk ck.
• Ak is the acknowledgment of file chunk ck by B.
• If one participant does not follow the honest behavior,
then the other party (x) can report the other’s misbehavior
to the smart contract for chunk ck which we denote Rxk .
• P xk signifies that one party (x) proves to the smart contract
for chunk ck to resolve a dispute.
• Not proving a chunk P xk equals to being offline (⊥x).
Notations adopted in this paper are given in Table I.
Data: PubB , PubS , Fp, DB , DS , ...
Result: B gets file F, S is paid Fp
initialization: set up of a secure channel;
for k = n..1 do
S sends chunk ck and intermediate hash Hck−1;
B verifies that f(f(...f(Hck−1,M
k
CL)...),M
k
1 ) = H
c
k;
if Integrity check passes then
B signs acknowledgement Ak and sends it to S;
S verifies the validity of Ak;
if Ak is NOT valid then
S reports to the smart contract that B misbehaves;
end
else
B reports to the smart contract that S misbehaves;
end
end
S finalizes the exchange to withdraw deposits;
Algorithm 1: Outline of FileBounty’s transfer protocol.
Dispute mediation is discussed in Section IV-A3. Note that
because of Merkle-Damgard’s chaining property, the iterative
hashing of the compression function f has to be done in
reverse order.
Table I
NOTATIONS ADOPTED FOR THIS WORK.
Notation Description
F File to be sold
Mi File block i
Hi Intermediate hash of Mi
h(M) Intermediate hash of block M
ck File chunk k
Hck Intermediate hash of ck
Mci The ith block in ck
sq File segment q
Hsq Intermediate hash of sq
S Seller of the file F
B Buyer of the file F
DS Deposit of the seller
DB Deposit of the buyer
Fv File value for the buyer
Fp File price paid by the buyer
Fc File selling costs for the seller
Tk Seller successfully transmitted file chunk k
Ak Buyer signed ack. of file chunk k
Rxk x reports the other party faulty at chunk k
Pxk x proves to settle a dispute⊥x Party x is considered offline
gx(k) Rel. utility for x after k transferred chunks
1) Setup Phase: In the setup phase, B should accept the
initial parameters set by S in order to proceed. B and S
should agree on the monetary file price Fp and their respective
deposits accordingly (cf. Section V-C), which are required
in case of dispute mediation. We assume that B and S
have their respective public keys PubB and PubS , which
correspond to their respective blockchain addresses. The file
F is divided into m fixed-size (BLOCK_SIZE) blocks for
the hash calculation. BLOCK_SIZE is determined by the
chosen cryptographic hash function (e.g. 64 bytes for SHA-
256). The file is transmitted in n chunks. Each chunk consists
of a fixed number (CHUNK_LEN abbr. CL) of blocks (cf.
Equation 1), s.t. n = dm/CLe.
ck =
{
M1 || ... || Mm−(n−k)CL , if k = 1
Mm−(n−k+1)CL+1 || ... || Mm−(n−k)CL , otherwise
(1)
Note the length of c1 is not necessarily equal to CL. For
the convenience of the reader but without loss of generality,
we assume c1 contains CL blocks in the rest of this paper. We
denote the ith block of chunk ck as Mki and its intermediate
hash as h(Mki ). The intermediate hash of ck is same as the
hash of its last block, i.e. Hck = h(M
k
CL). To make sure that
the protocol terminates, we define as MAX_TIMEOUT
the maximum time that a participant has to respond before
being considered offline, which we set by default to 24
hours. As a permissionless blockchain acts as a timestamping
service, we can choose to either use the block height or
the block timestamp (UNIX timestamps). Summarizing, in
the setup phase B and S should agree on the file price
Fp, deposits DB , DS , BLOCK_SIZE, CHUNK_LEN
and MAX_TIMEOUT and deposit to the smart contract
respectively start the transmission.
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2) File Transfer Phase: We assume that S and B are now
capable of connecting off-chain. S starts by sending B the
chunk cn and the intermediate hash Hcn−1 (cf. Figure 1).
After having received cn, the buyer verifies that
f(f(...f(Hcn−1,M
n
CL)...),M
n
1 ) = H(F ). Note that f(·) cor-
responds to the one-way compression function, while H(·)
corresponds to the iterated compression function over the
whole input. If the hash is correct, B signs an acknowledg-
ment, An, and sends it to S. The acknowledgment states,
that the valid file chunk cn was received by the buyer. S
then continues the protocol by giving B the next file chunk
cn−1 and the intermediate hash Hcn−2, to which B answers
by signing the acknowledgment An−1.
For every k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, S sends B the file chunk ck and
the intermediate hash Hck−1, to which B responds by signing
Ak. By the definition of the Merkle-Damgård construction,
Hc0 = H0 = IV , the initialization vector.
3) Dispute Phase: Both, buyer and seller are able to
report the misbehaviour of the opponent and we consider
non-responsiveness to be malicious. Both are therefore in-
centivized to respond during the execution of the protocol
(within MAX_TIMEOUT ). In the following paragraphs,
we discuss how to handle the misbehavior of either the seller
or the buyer.
a) Misbehavior of the seller: If S interrupts the protocol
or sends an incorrect file chunk at any point during the file
transfer phase, B can notify the smart contract that S behaved
incorrectly, noted RBk . S then has MAX_TIMEOUT to
prove the possession of the last block of ck (i.e. MkCL).
FileBounty offers two proof methods: First, S publishes MkCL
and the digest (i.e. h(MkCL−1)) directly to the smart contract;
then, the smart contract verifies that f(h(MkCL−1),M
k
CL) =
Hck. Second, S sends the zkSNARKs proofs to the smart
contract without revealing any content of F , which is more
privacy-preserving but consumes a higher on-chain cost. S
can choose the appropriate solution according to the value of
MkCL. Depending on whether S provides a valid proof, the
smart contract assigns different payoffs to S and B. We refer
the reader to Section IV-A4 for the exact payoff calculation.
b) Misbehavior of the buyer: S can report B at any
moment if the buyer acknowledges a chunk ck without hav-
ing received it4, noted RSk . The smart contract then allows
B within MAX_TIMEOUT to prove the knowledge of
h(MkCL−1) and M
k
CL, s.t. f(h(M
k
CL−1),M
k
CL) = H
c
k (similar
to the case of seller’s misbehavior). S can also report B for
not responding an acknowledgement Ak by submitting the last
received acknowledgement Ak+1.
4) Payoff Phase: Supposing that both parties behave hon-
estly, once S receives the acknowledgment of A1 from B, S
can submit it to the smart contract to terminate the protocol. In
this case, S receives both the file price Fp and the deposit DS ,
while B receives the deposit DB and has received the file F
through the off-chain communication channel. Depending on
4This may look counter-intuitive, but this functionality enables us to remove
the possibility of extortion attacks from the rational seller, as explained in
section V-C
the protocol execution steps, for example in case of disputes,
we define the particular payouts for the seller and the buyer.
We distinguish between the payout defined by the smart con-
tract (i.e., the monetary amount that the smart contract pays)
and the utility function (i.e., the utility of the seller and buyer
for each chunk of the file). For the ease of understanding, we
provide a visual representation in Figure 3.
B. Extension to a Multi-Party File Exchange
In the P2P exchange setup, files are split into z segments.
We extended the fingerprint of a file to the list of all segments’
hashes (i.e. {Hs1 ||Hs2 ||...||Hsz}). Similar to file chunks, we take
the intermediate hash of the last block in segment sq as the
segment hash Hsq . H
s
q is used as the target hash for sq in
the exchange, as well as the initial vector for sq+1, so that
the buyer can verify the integrity of each segment. We can
easily find Hsz = H(F ). In the P2P setup, the smart contract
needs to store additional parameters, namely the hash list and
the segment size. Based on these, segments can be exchanged
separately and concurrently — segments are transmitted in
chunks; the dispute mediation and the payoffs of all segments
are independent.
We consider the buyer B is willing to purchase a z-
segment file F with fingerprint {Hs1 ||Hs2 ||...||Hsz} from z
sellers S1, S2, ..., Sz . We assume all seller are sharing F at
the same price (i.e. Fp/z per segment) and deposit (i.e. DS/z
per segment). The P2P extension is executed as follows.
Serving Each seller starts to share F by sending a transaction
with the required parameters (i.e. the fingerprint etc.)
and enough deposits which at least exceeds DS/z. The
amount of deposits determines the number of segments
that can be exchanged concurrently.
Handshake B is required to prove the willingness of selling
a specific chunk of each seller before initiating the
exchanges. B thus requests segment sq from seller Sq
with an off-chain message (cf. Equation 2).
rsq = { buyer : PubB , seller : PubSq ,
fingerprint : Hs1 ||Hs2 ||...||Hsz ,
segment : Hsq }
(2)
The seller Sq then signs the valid request as the con-
firmation. We utilize the BLS signature scheme which
allows B to aggregate z signatures into a short one so
that the smart contract can validate it efficiently. Once all
the confirmations are received, B sends the combination
of the requests with the aggregated signature, the total
price and the deposits to the smart contract.
Transfer All sellers send chunks to B in descending order.
B verifies the authenticity of every received chunk.
Dispute The exchange threads are considered to be separate
which means that any dispute is mediated independently.
The dispute payoff scheme of the P2P scheme imitates
the one-to-one exchange.
Payoff After receiving all the segments, B can notify the
smart contract to redeem the deposits with an on-chain
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Figure 3. Payoff values for the seller and the buyer, depending on the protocol transition steps for two file chunks. S stands for the seller, B stands for the
buyer. For each payoff, we distinguish between the payoff by the smart contract (left side) and the utility payoff (right side). For each payoff, the upper payoff
concerns the buyer, while the lower concerns the seller. If one participant does not follow the protocol (i.e does not send a chunk, does not acknowledge or
goes offline), then the other (x) can initiate a dispute for chunk k, denoted Rxk ; it is then up to the first participant to resolve the dispute. To simplify the
presentation, we omitted some sub-cases where a participant becomes offline and also the branch in which buyer acknowledges the receipt of the file chunk
in case of not receiving it.
transaction. The file price is sent to the seller directly and
the sellers’ deposits are unlocked in the smart contract for
recycling.
The recycling mechanism facilitates the repeatable selling
with one on-chain transaction, which reduces the margin cost
of sellers. For a P2P trade, only two on-chain transactions
are required (i.e. one for the buyer to initiate the transaction
and one to finalize the transmission). Note that the same file
can be priced differently by distinct sellers and we leave such
specification for further work.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Similar to Franklin et al. [30], we consider FileBounty fair
if the file exchanged is consistent with the known hash value.
Further formalizing on the attacker model in Section III-D, we
moreover define utility functions in Section V-B to measure
how S and B value F along with the transmission of the
file chunks. Under our rational adversary assumption, in any
situation, a player takes action to maximize the final economic
benefits. An adversary is not willing to perform an attack if
the financial return is lower than the payoffs of following the
protocol (i.e. Fp + DS for S and DB + Fv for B). We also
assume the trade only proceeds s.t. Fc ≤ Fp and Fp ≤ Fv .
A. Attack Analysis
In this section, we analyze considered malicious behaviours.
1) S doesn’t have any knowledge of F and trades with B:
Our mechanism guarantees that S loses the deposit performing
this attack. Such an attack is therefore irrational.
2) S sends chunks out of order: In each round, B only
expects the chunk with the target hash value and considers
others invalid, even though S sends a chunk that belongs to
F . Sending chunks out of order is deemed to be malicious
and causes a financial loss of S.
3) S sends all chunks but c1 of a compressed or encrypted
file: In case B reports and then S proves, the payoff for S is
n−1
n · Fp + Fc, whereas the honest payoff for S is Fp +DS .
This attack is accordingly ruled out by choosing the seller’s
deposit, s.t. DS > Fc − 1n · Fp. We further discuss deposit
determination in Section V-C.
4) S does not send any file chunk ck or sends a wrong
chunk, and B may be forced to acknowledge it in fear of
losing deposit DB: The possibility for B to acknowledge
an undelivered chunk gives S an incentive not to send some
chunk, because B will acknowledge it anyway to retrieve
the deposit. We introduce a counter-intuitive mechanism of
offering S the option to report that B acknowledged some
chunk ck without receiving it. If B then fails to prove this, S
receives the whole sum DS +DB +Fp . Therefore, a rational
buyer will never acknowledge an undelivered chunk.
5) B extorts x from S after the protocol initiated. Other-
wise, B will report the dishonesty of S: If disagreeing, S
will lose the deposit DS and receives Fp/n. Otherwise, S can
recover DS+Fp−x until the protocol is finalized successfully.
This attack seems feasible when x < DS+ n−1n ·Fp. However,
the optimal strategy of B is to blackmail S in the next
every round till the end, which means S will lose more if
surrendering. The best response of S is hence to revolt rather
than to surrender. Given that both S and B are rational and
B knows S is rational, B will not initiate this extortion attack
because S is not going to agree.
6) B does not acknowledge c2, reports not receiving c2 and
tries to brute-force search c1, if c1 is low-entropy: We assume
that B can find c1 successfully. Nevertheless, once S prove
with M2CL, B only recovers
2
n · Fp but loses the deposit DB .
Therefore, this attack is irrational with a reasonably large DB .
Similarly, due to the risk of losing deposits, the attack that B
doesn’t acknowledge c1 is unreasonable.
B. Utility functions
Files differ on how the seller and the buyer value them,
in particular regarding individual file chunks. This is relevant
for calculating optimal deposit sizes for the existence of a
subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium. In practice, though, we do
not necessarily know how each participant values a particular
file; we, therefore, analyze the worst possible case and find
participants’ deposits in such a way that the honest behavior
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is always the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium. We use a
special deposit refunding scheme to achieve that the honest
behavior of both seller and the buyer is the subgame-perfect
equilibrium solution, see [31] for related schemes. For some
files, the utility function of a participant may grow close to
linear (e.g. image files5, movies), while other files are only
valuable in their entirety (e.g. encrypted/compressed files).
The third category of files might be files where the value of
the first chunk outweighs the value of the sum of all other
chunks heavily. We define gx(k) to be the relative utility
function, for party x ∈ {Buyer, Seller}, after k chunks of
the file F are sent. Note that the utility function of the buyer,
gB(k), is monotonically increasing with the number of chunks
as he gains more information about the file; on the other
hand the utility function of the seller, gS(k), is monotonically
decreasing with the number of chunks as he loses exclusivity
of the file. In order to prove that our protocol is incentive-
compatible (it is in the participants’ best interest to follow the
rules), we analyze the arbitrary utility functions of the buyer
and the seller in a rational adversary setting.
1) Require the entire file: For encrypted files, the utility
function of the buyer is 0 until the chunk c1 is received (cf.
Equation 3).
gB(k) =
{
1, if k = n
0, otherwise (3)
The worst case for the buyer is that the seller’s utility
function is as follows (cf. Equation 4).
gS(k) =
{
0, if k = n
1, otherwise (4)
In that case, the seller wants the exact opposite of the buyer:
he wants to send all the chunks except the last one, while the
buyer is only interested in the last chunk. FileBounty therefore
requires the deposit of the seller to be sufficiently high, to
guarantee that the seller will send the entirety of the file.
2) Only require the first chunk: Recall, that the first chunk
that the seller sends corresponds to the end of the file (contain-
ing padding and the file length). In some cases, the buyer may
solely be interested in knowing this first chunk, for example
if he only needs to know the length of the file or in some
specific situations where the last chunk is particularly valuable
(cf. Equation 5).
gB(k) =
{
1, if k ≥ 1
0, if k = 0 (5)
The worst case for the seller would be that the buyer’s utility
function is the exact opposite of the seller (cf. Equation 6),
because after receiving just the first chunk, the buyer already
has no incentive to continue the transfer. Yet, the smart
contract will only reward the seller with 1n · Fp. From the
perspective of the buyer, the bulk of the value has already been
5We acknowledge that image files might be compressed in such a way that
coarse-grained details are first transmitted.
exchanged (that is, the buyer has already received a value of
Fv , although the seller only received 1n · Fp).
gS(k) =
{
0, if k ≥ 1
1, if k = 0 (6)
All the remaining possible utility functions lie in between
these two extremes. In the following section, we make use of
the observations derived from the behavior of our mechanism
to parametrize the buyer’s and seller’s deposits, DB and DS ,
in such a way that honest behavior is a Nash Equilibrium.
This implies that it is in both participants’ best interest to
behave honestly, as the deposits they provide to the smart
contract are high enough and the deposit refunding scheme
guarantees higher utility in case of honest behavior than in
case of misbehaving.
C. Subgame perfect Equilibrium
In this section, we show that honest behavior in FileBounty
is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
1) Preliminaries: We denote the game with G. There are
two players in G, seller and buyer. Game G is sequential,
players take their decisions one after another. The strategies
available to the seller depending on the level of the game
are the following: sending the file chunk, not sending the file
chunk, prove sending the file chunk, timing out, reporting
the wrong acknowledgment of the buyer and not reporting
the wrong acknowledgment. The strategies available to the
buyer are acknowledgment of the receipt of the file chunk,
claiming not receiving the file chunk, timing out and proving
the receipt of the file chunk. To guarantee honest behavior
from both participants, mechanism require them to deposit a
monetary amount, DB for the buyer and DS for the seller.
The FileBounty protocol sets what those deposits should be,
depending on the price Fp agreed upon. Recall that the smart
contract has authority over the money sent by the participants;
in case of misbehavior, the smart contract acts as an impartial
judge for dispute mediation and distributes payoffs according
to the protocol.
2) Double Auction: Note that exchanging the file and
setting price is an instance of the double auction problem [32].
In the double auction, a single seller is the owner of one item
which is traded with a single buyer. Both the seller and the
buyer have privately known values for consuming the item, in
our case Fc for the seller and Fv for the buyer. These values are
unknown to the mechanism. Intuitively, there are three mini-
mal requirements for the "good" mechanism, individual ratio-
nality: the participation of the agents is voluntary, meaning that
at any point they may leave the mechanism and consume their
initial endowments. The second requirement is budget balance:
the mechanism is not allowed to subsidize the agents or to
make any profits, the latter means that the amount paid by the
buyer is completely transferred to seller. The third requirement
is incentive compatibility (IC), meaning that reporting true
valuations is the best strategy for both seller and the buyer. The
seminal paper of Myerson and Satterthwaite [32] studies the
double auction problem. The well-known impossibility result
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states that in this setting there is no mechanism which is
fully efficient and at the same time is incentive compatible,
individually rational and budget balanced. Blumrosen and
Dobzinski [33] design an approximately efficient mechanism
for achieving optimal expected social welfare function, that
is equal to the maximum of the two private values Fc and
Fv . In other words, the optimal social outcome is achieved
when the item goes to the person who values it the most. It
is proved that the only mechanism which satisfies the three
properties discussed above is a posted price auction, in which
the mechanism posts some price, in our setting Fp, if Fc ≤ Fp
and Fp ≤ Fv then the trade takes place. Buyer pays Fp to the
seller and gets the item. If one of the conditions does not
hold, then no trade takes place. The posted price mechanism
is clearly individually rational, because the utilities of both
players are non-negative in either case. Reporting true values
is clearly a dominant strategy for both players, because reports
from both sides do not affect their payoffs, in the calculation of
the utility only the private value is used. If any of the players
changes the true anticipated outcome of the mechanism, it
only decreases his utility. Blumrosen and Dobzinski [33]
design the mechanism which achieves a social welfare that is
equal to 0.63 times the optimal social welfare, given only the
probability distribution on the value Fv . On the negative side,
Leonardi et al. [34] prove that there is no mechanism which
approximates the optimum by more than a factor of 0.74 in
the worst case. Although, providing efficient posted price can
also be integrated into our mechanism, at this point we assume
that agreeing on the price Fp is done outside FileBounty. Over
the time, information can be aggregated to refine probability
distributions of the valuations and consequently, more efficient
posted price mechanisms can be implemented.
3) Finding the right size for deposits: In this section, we
will determine the optimal sizes for the deposits of both
players of the game, in order to guarantee that the honest
behavior of both players corresponds to the subgame-perfect
equilibrium solution.
Theorem V.1. There exist deposits DS and DB such that
honest behavior of both players corresponds to the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium of the extensive form game G.
Proof. See Appendix A.
From the analysis we exclude the case where a (malicious)
buyer may have a file already. In this case, a buyer can
acknowledge the receipt of the chunk he has not received,
and the rationality analysis boils down to the belief of the
seller about the state. Note that given the seller believes the
buyer does not have a file, he will send each chunk anyway.
Our analysis solves this case. It is easy to observe that the
linear refunding scheme by the mechanism of the price Fp
is arbitrary and serves only the purpose of simplicity and
fairness. Attacks in the form of blackmail do not work. This
is guaranteed by the assumptions of rationality and complete
knowledge. If any of the parties blackmails the other, asking
to collaborate or, otherwise he will make the other party lose
deposit, the other party can ignore this kind of threat. Since
the other party knows the blackmailing party is rational, the
threat will never be realized. One chunk of the file is displayed
on blockchain, in case of dispute. This can, in principle, be
exploited by malicious buyers, to reveal the file chunk by
chunk. On the other hand, since for each chunk they will lose
a complete deposit, this is not a rational way to behave.
D. Secure Multi-Party Exchange
As file segments are exchanged independently, multi-party
exchanges are secure as long as all segments are exchanged
securely. We prove in Appendix A that honest behaviour
corresponds to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the
single seller case when both DS and DB are at least Fp.
Similarly, in the multi-party case, the security of a single
thread relies on the conditions that (1) the buyer’s deposit
for a segment is not smaller than the segment price (i.e.
DB/z ≥ Fp/z); (2) the selling cost of a segment is not larger
than the seller’s deposit for a segment. We reasonably conclude
that the files where value is evenly distributed (e.g. images
and movies) meet both conditions if DS ≥ Fp and DB ≥ Fp.
However, for the value-concentrated files, the selling cost of
a single segment varies from 0 up to Fp. Therefore, DS is
required to be increased to at least z · Fp in order to preserve
the security properties in every exchanging thread.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
FileBounty is a symbiosis of an off- and on-chain compo-
nent: an Ethereum smart contract serves for dispute mediation;
and, an off-chain client is responsible for the actual file transfer
(note that the off-chain client needs to monitor the smart
contract state). We implement the off-chain component as a
browser application written in Typescript (7 500 LOC), while
the Ethereum component is a Solidity smart contract (728
LOC). The seller and buyer clients first establish a WebRTC
connection. Once the connection is established, the protocol
as described in Algorithm 1 is executed. Note that both clients
are required to be synchronized with the blockchain. In con-
sideration of the weakness of SHA-1 [35], we chose SHA-256
as the cryptographic compression function. We implement the
SHA-256 hash function in the smart contract and the clients,
such that we can execute the Merkle-Damgård construction on
individual file blocks. We also implement a zkSNARK contract
for the privacy-preserving possession verification.
1) On-chain Costs: Given no dispute, the on-chain oper-
ations of starting a sale, purchasing a file, starting a dispute
and finalizing an exchange, cost below 170 000 gas ($0.09 at
a gas price of 3 GWei6). In FileBounty, the most expensive
transaction is to resolve a dispute by verifying the possession
of a block of 64 bytes. A cleartext verification by calculat-
ing SHA-256 hash directly costs about 350 000 gas ($0.22),
whereas the zkSNARK scheme costs 1 658 000 gas ($1.01).
The cost is constant regardless of the file size or chunk size. In
a P2P setting, verifying a BLS signature costs approximately
6At the time of writing, the US dollar to Ether exchange rate is around
$200/Ether.
8
365 000 gas ($0.23) [36]. We estimate the cost of purchasing
a file from 10 sellers to be below 450 000 gas ($0.28).
Assuming a PoW blockchain supports ten transactions per
second, this amounts to 864 000 transactions per day. An esti-
mated upper limit of FileBounty’s throughput is thus 432 000
P2P downloads per day. This holds assuming the absence of
disputes and assuming that a seller is “re-using” its collateral
for F . Note that the measured number of daily downloads
via BitTorrent between Dec’03 to Jan’04, is in the range of
237 500 to 576 500 [37].
2) Off-chain Costs: Transmitting a file of n chunk requires
n rounds of interactions between the seller and buyer. The
chunk length can be adjusted flexibly without increasing any
on-chain cost (e.g. a file of 256MB transmitted in chunks of
256KB needs 1024 rounds of interactions which would be
reduced to 512 if increase the chunk size to 512KB).
3) Zero Knowledge Proof Costs: The zkSnark circuit to
verify the possession of a 64-byte block contains 29 339
constraints. Generating a zkSnark proof, which has a constant
size of 2 294 bits, costs 1.585 seconds on a virtual machine
with 16× 2GHz CPUs.
VII. RELATED WORK
Fair exchange has been extensively studied regarding fair
multi-party computation [1], [10], [11], [13], [38]–[40], fair
multi-party exchange [5]–[9], [30], [41], [42], contract signing
[3], [4], [43], [44] and proof of ownership [45], [46]. The
impossibility of fair exchange without a trusted third party has
been proven in [47]. With the recent decade development of
the blockchain technology, smart contracts on permissionless
blockchains are now generally considered as trusted third
parties, which makes fair exchange between multiple parties
feasible. In the following, we mainly discuss related solutions
based on permissionless blockchains. NashX [48] attempts to
address the fair exchange problem leveraging Bitcoin and the
idea of Nash equilibria. Before initiating a trade, both parities
deposit some amount of Bitcoin that is more valuable than the
transaction amount. Any default may cause the destruction of
all the deposits. This solution is not resistant against extortion
attacks, even against a rational adversary, is not automatic and
does not provide integrity verification. FairSwap by Dziem-
bowski et al. [14] allows secure digital content exchange
through sending ciphertexts off-chain and revealing the key
on-chain. FairSwap relies on a judge smart contract to arbitrate
the misbehavior of the sender. OptiSwap [49] further extends
FairSwap that reduces the overheads in communication and
computation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we present a practical and efficient protocol,
which allows a buyer to purchase a file from one or multiple
sellers. The buyer is assumed to know the cryptographic hash
of the file, which allows us to perform an automated dispute
mediation through a blockchain based smart contract. We show
that honest behavior in FileBounty is a Nash equilibrium under
a rational adversary. Under honest execution of the protocol,
our implementation only requires three on-chain transactions
for the exchange of any file size. In the case of disputes, we
require up to two additional on-chain transactions. Contrary
to previous work, FileBounty has an inherent integrity verifi-
cation, for every exchanged file chunk. Our evaluations shows
that the protocol is practical.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem V.1
Proof. In Section V-A, we state that the buyer will never
acknowledge a file chunk that hasn’t been received, the reason
being that acknowledging gives the seller the chance to claim
the whole sum, and for the seller it is always strictly dominat-
ing strategy to do so. We disregard this part of the sequential
game G completely. This saves us from considering a game
tree which consists of exponentially many states, so we instead
deal with a tree of linear size.
We use backwards induction. The claim of the induction
is that in each subtree rooted at Sk, honest behavior is the
subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e. the seller sends chunk at
each state and buyer acknowledges it. Final payments from
the smart contract in case of honest behavior are DB for the
buyer and DS + Fp for the seller.
In the subtree rooted at the node B′′k , which corresponds
to the state that the seller did not send the k-th chunk, buyer
will always choose to report, RBn−k+1, and because of this the
seller ends up with the utility
max{k
n
Fp + g
S(k)Fc, g
S(k − 1)Fc} ≤ k
n
Fp + Fc,
on the other hand, the final utility for the seller in the honest
behavior of both players is equal to Fp +DS , by backwards
induction assumption. This implies that if DS is at least Fp
then Fp + DS ≥ knFp + Fc, because the right-hand side is
maximized when k = n and we also know that Fp ≥ Fc by
definition, otherwise the trade does not take place at all.
For the buyer an analogous argument works; in the state
B′k, where the seller already sent the k-th chunk, the buyer’s
payoff in case of playing RBn−k+1 is equal to
n− k
n
Fp + g
B(k)Fv,
while by the backwards induction hypothesis, if he plays
An−k+1, his utility is equal to DB+Fv . If we take DB ≥ Fp,
then at each node B′k, the buyer will play honestly, because
DB+Fv ≥ n−kn Fp+gB(k)Fv for any k. Therefore, the honest
behavior corresponds to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
of the game G with deposits of size DS = Fp and DB = Fp.
For the exposition purposes we do not consider all cases as
those cases are treated analogously and the same result can be
derived.
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